Fodor's radical concept nativism flowed from his view that hypothesis testing is the only route to concept acquisition. Many have successfully objected to the overly-narrow restriction to learning by hypothesis testing. Existing representations can be connected to a new representational vehicle so as to constitute a sustaining mechanism for a new representation, without the new representation thereby being constituted by or structured out of the old. This paper argues that there is also a deeper objection. Connectionism shows that a more fundamental assumption underpinning the debate can also be rejected: the assumption that the development of a new representation must be explained in content-involving terms if innateness is to be avoided.
(1) Introduction It is just a restatement of the old programme in which new representations are complex constructs out of innate primitives. For present purposes we can concede to Fodor that that programme has been unsuccessful, especially as an account of lexical concepts. Fodor has since retreated somewhat from that position: Fodor (1998 Fodor ( , 2008 , including becoming more sympathetic to alternatives to hypothesis testing as an account of concept acquisition (Fodor 2008, pp. 162-168). course when the models are applied to the real world, representations will be realized in multiple neurons. But the units over which representations are distributed in the models are not neurons. PDP modellers often explicitly eschew a commitment to a 1-1 correspondence between processing units and neurons. Version One therefore does not capture the force of PDP's distribution claim.
Fodor offers Version Two as the only alternative. But this is just a familiar story about structured representations. Connectionists' distributed representations are merely some kind of complex constructs out of the representations that are their constituent units.
For example, Fodor and colleagues interpret Churchland's "state space semantics" (Churchland 1998 (Churchland , 2012 as treating individual hidden layer units as representing complex microfeatures, with a distributed pattern of activation having its content as some kind of complex weighted conjunction of these microfeatures (Fodor and Pylyshyn 1988, § 2.1.4; Fodor and Lepore 1999, p. 391) . Distributed representations are structured out of the 3 This objection to both the versions of connectionism offered here has been raised by Fodor in many places, e.g. in Fodor and Pylyshyn (1988) and Fodor and McLaughlin (1990) . The formulation explicitly in terms of a dilemma is found in Fodor (2004) , a draft paper posted on the New York University website. 4 Fodor and Pylyshyn (1990), § 5.6. 5 Fodor and Pylyshyn (1990) , § 2.1. 4. representations over which they are distributed, and the content of a distributed representation is fixed by the contents of the constituent units.
Fodor rejects Version Two on the basis that constructing concepts out of pre-existing representations is a failed research programme. He argues that there are no plausible definitions for most lexical concepts, and that neither prototypes nor exemplars compose in the way that is required by a compositional semantics. Connectionists can, and often do, object at this stage. Fodor's objections to prototype and exemplar theories may be surmountable. Or the connectionist's way of constructing distributed representations out of the contents of individual nodes may be different in important respects, so as to overcome extant objections. Furthermore, "constructivist" neural networks side-step the worry about constructing distributed representations out of existing microfeatures since they allow for the recruitment of new hidden units that previously played no role in the network (Mareschal & Schultz 1996 , Quartz & Sejnowski 1997 .
These lines of reply to Fodor are familiar. They may be the best way to characterise some classes of connectionist models. But there is another answer available too. 
(3) Developing New Connectionist Representations
Even static, programmer-designed neural networks can develop novel representations. This section gives an account of how. In particular, it shows how familiar training algorithms can transform a system without representations into one that has representational capacities.
The basic idea is that there are connectionist learning algorithms that transform information into representation. Before a connectionist system has been trained, the units of its hidden layers, and perhaps its input layer too, can be merely information-carriers.
Their tokening will correlate with various features of the items coded as input. When the instantiation of some property F by an object changes the probability of the instantiation of another property G by an object, we can say that F carries correlational information about G. Correlational information is ubiquitous. Representation is something more substantial.
The fact that single units and distributed patterns of activation carry correlational information (about all sorts of affairs) does not imply that they have representational content. Typically, it is only after training that distributed patterns of activation have the right properties to have genuinely representational content (truth conditions, satisfaction conditions, etc.). Of course, there is no agreement as to exactly what more is needed, but all sides agree that bare correlational information is not sufficient for representation.
Connectionists need not think of individual units as being representational at all. Indeed, Chalmers (1992) takes that to be characteristic of connectionist models: the items over which computational processes are defined are more fine-grained than the lowest level at which representational contents are properly attributable to states of the system. An example is the colour classification network of Laakso and Cottrell (2000) . One way of coding the inputs there proceeded as follows. For a given colour patch, reflectance readings from a spectrophotometer were taken at 12 places on the electromagnetic spectrum (between wavelengths of 400nm and 700nm, at 25nm intervals). Competitive networks use unsupervised learning to find clusters in the inputs on which they are trained (Rolls and Treves 1998, ch. 4) . Unsupervised learning in auto-associative networks can also serve to identify the central tendencies or prototypes found in a range in input data, even where the prototype itself was never encountered in training (Plunkett and Sinha 1992) . Both start with bare correlational information and end up with vehicles (clusters, prototypes) that are plausibly representations.
The point about the development of new representations can be made most starkly in networks in which there is no representation at all at the level of individual units before training, like the examples above. But that is not essential. The absence of initial representations just serves to make it obvious that the way that new representational capacities develop is not explicable-by-content. Representational development in these cases is a matter of using statistical learning to build mere information-bearers into representations. In other cases, pre-existing resources that are representations play a role in this process. What is crucial is that their role is merely causal. The way a new representational type develops, at a hidden layer say, depends on the correlational information carried by input units and hidden units, but there is no rational or contentbased explanation of the transition from initial resources to new representations. Existing resources like the input units are relied on for the correlational information they carry, on which the connectionist training algorithm can act; but the story of the building of the new representational capacities is causal-correlational, not representational.
Application to an Example
To discuss a widely-known example, Sejnowski and Rosenberg's (1987) NETtalk network was trained using supervised learning to map English text to phonetic representations of its pronunciation. Where networks undergo supervised learning, clusters may form in hidden layer state space, leading to new distributed representations at the hidden layer. In NETtalk, before training there were no relevant partitions or clusters in hidden layer state space (although distributed patterns of activation would necessarily have carried some correlational information from the outset). The result of training the network to produce correct representations of phonemes at the output layer was that the network learnt to categorise inputs into vowels and consonants at the hidden layer on the way.
According to two representative theories of content, asymmetric dependence theory and infotel semantics, this process leads to the creation of new representations out of nonrepresentational resources. Learning a new representation of Cs is a matter of acquiring a new mental item R with the right properties firstly, to count as a mental symbol, and secondly to have the content C. According to Fodor's asymmetric dependence theory of 6 There are many examples in which learning in connectionist systems creates attractors or clusters in state space (Churchland & Sejnowski 1992 , Rupert 1998 , Tiffany 1999 . If there are reasons to see those attractors as being representations, then this is a process of turning information into representation. content, having a representation R with content C is a matter of having a mental symbol whose tokening covaries with the presence of Cs, and of asymmetric dependence: to the extent that the tokening of R also covaries with any other property C*, it would not socovary if R did not also covary with C (Fodor 1990) . Call the mechanism which puts R in the right relation of causal covariation and counterfactual dependence with C a sustaining mechanism (Cowie 1999, p. 101; Laurence & Margolis 2002 ). Fodor's theory of content has faced many objections, and Fodor doesn't seem particularly keen on it himself, 7 but taking it at face value, learning a new representation of C is just a matter of going through a psychological acquisition process which results in a sustaining mechanism that connects a new symbol type R with Cs (with the appropriate causal profile).
Applying the asymmetric dependence theory to NETtalk, it is reasonably clear that there is no representation in the hidden layer at the outset, when connection weights are set randomly or arbitrarily. From the outset, both input and hidden layer units will carry a variety of correlational information, but there is no basis for thinking that there are any relations of asymmetric dependence amongst these correlations. After training, activation of the vowel partition of hidden layer state space correlates with presentation of a vowel to the network. It also correlates with other properties of the stimulus, say with the stimulus being a letter with a certain disjunctively-specified shape S. But that correlation is plausibly asymmetrically dependent on the correlation with vowels -were it not for the correlation with vowels, which is a useful intermediate to the classification made at the output layer, the network would not have arrived at a correlation with shape S.
For contrast, we can also assess the representational contents in NETtalk using infotel semantics (Shea 2007a ), a modification of teleosemantics (Millikan 1984; Papineau 1987) .
Infotel semantics looks at the way a representation is used, as well as the way it is produced, in fixing its content. Out of all the correlational information carried by a putative representation, it focuses on the correlation that accounts for the system's having been trained (or evolved) to behave as it does (as argued by Dretske 1998; Ryder 2004 deploys a related idea). Applied to PDP models, this will deliver as content a condition specific to each representation-type, such that keeping track of that condition is what enables the network to produce correct outputs (where correctness is the standard against which the learning algorithm was trained).
Applied to NETtalk, infotel semantics implies that the output layer represents phonemes: in the course of training, the modeller took the units to represent phonemes, using that as the standard against which to generate an error signal. At the hidden layer, before training we have only correlational information. After training we have a partition of activation space into two groups of distributed patterns. Each correlates with a relevant feature of the input (vowel vs. consonant), and that distinction is consumed in downstream 7 'I assume that intentional content reduces (in some way or other, but, please, don't ask me how) to information; this is, I suppose, the most deniable thesis of my bundle.' (Fodor 1994, p. 4) . 'If you want an externalist metaphysics of the content of innate concepts that's not just bona fide but true, I'm afraid there isn't one "yet". ' Fodor (2001) that connects clusters at the hidden layer with properties of words. There is no explanation-by-content of the transition from a non-representational hidden layer, before training, to representations of vowels and consonants at the hidden layer, after training. Obj2 is a substantive assumption that has been implicitly constraining theorising in cognitive science. It is motivated by the assumption of explanation-by-content. That assumption also underpins Fodor's strong innateness claims, as we shall see in the next section.
(5) Avoiding Fodor's Argument For Radical Concept Nativism
But what about Fodor's argument for radical concept nativism? We have seen how even static connectionist models can account for the development of entirely novel representations. They are not innate: PDP models offer an account of their development, and does so in recognisably psychological terms. 9 How, then, is Fodor's argument avoided?
At first pass, Fodor's argument that connectionism offers nothing new seems quite separate from his argument for radical concept nativism. In this section we will see that Fodor's argument for radical concept nativism is in fact underpinned by the same assumption that lay behind his identification of Obj1 with Obj2 in the last section.
Connectionism's insight is to show why that assumption can be rejected. In this section we spell out how doing so side-steps Fodor's nativism puzzle.
Fodor argues that concepts are either constructed from primitives or they are innate.
His view is that most lexical concepts -concepts at the level of grain of individual wordsare not constructed out of primitives. So they are innate, which is to say that they are not acquired via a learning process. (Fodor 1975, p. 36) . If that were right, then a person would indeed need to be able to formulate a claim before they could learn that it was true, which would exclude a learning-based account of the acquisition of entirely novel representations. That presents a puzzle, since it is implausible that my concepts of a carburettor (CARBURETTOR) or of my friend John (JOHN) are innate. The concept of innateness is notoriously problematic (Mameli 2008). Fodor's central concern is whether concepts are learnt (Fodor 1975 (Fodor , 1991 (Fodor , 1998 (Fodor , 2008 Cowie 1999; Samuels 2002) , so here I will take it that innate representations are not learnt or acquired by a psychological process and that they admit of a poverty of the stimulus argument (Shea 2012a (Shea , 2012b . (2002) and Carey (2009) give detailed accounts of forms of concept learning that are not a matter of hypothesis testing.
11
Fodor has softened slightly in more recent work. First he allowed that concepts themselves may not be innate -what is innate is, for each concept, a domain-specific disposition, specific to each such concept, to acquire that concept (Fodor 1998) . But this still leaves Fodor postulating an innate domain-specific ability to develop DOORKNOB as a result of interaction with doorknobs. He has since added that the innate endowment might determine the geometry of neural attractor landscapes that realise concepts (Fodor 2008, p. 164) . The worry remains that far too much is being taken to be innate. For simplicity, this paper 
12
Fodor has more recently accepted that these accounts of concept learning do not involve hypothesis testing (Fodor 2008, pp. 163-167) , and even that there is a 'jump' from the existing representations that are involved in creating the prototype: 'we jump, by some or other "automatic" process, from our stereotypes to our concepts ' (2008, p. 164) . However, he does not draw the moral that there are psychological acquisition processes that are not explicable-by-content; indeed, he argues that the way this process works is due to innate constraints (2008, p. 164) .
novel contentful item cannot itself be susceptible to explanation in terms of content.
Our account of the development of new representations in the PDP models in section 3 above is an existence proof that there can be such cases. It escapes Fodor's argument for radical representational nativism by rejecting his implicit commitment to explanation-bycontent. That commitment can now be seen to lie behind both his radical concept nativism and his rejection of connectionism. But once PDP modelling has opened up this portion of logical space, it becomes clear that other cases of representational development should be understood in the same way. Shea (2011) has argued that Carey's influential account of children's development of the concept of natural number (Carey 2009 ) also involves a step that is not explicable-by-content. 13 Below I offer an example that goes beyond connectionism to illustrate that this could be a more general phenomenon.
Face Recognition
Morton & Johnson's (1991) theory of the development of face recognition furnishes a further useful example of how acquisition could fashion representations out of purely nonrepresentational resources. Tested 30 minutes after being born, infants show a tendency preferentially to look at moving stimuli that have a configuration something like this:
This tendency seems to be innate, in the sense that no learning is involved in the infant coming to have the looking bias. A poverty-of-the-stimulus argument can be made about it.
The infant's disposition preferentially to track this category of inputs (perhaps driven by a subcortical visuomotor pathway) implicitly carries the information that such stimuli are worth attending to and learning about. If we ask where that information came from, we have to appeal to the infant's evolutionary history, not its individual experience. We can suppose that the bias is adaptive -it works well in the kinds of environments infants are likely to find themselves in. The adaptive match between behavioural bias and usual environment is due to evolution, not individual learning.
The infant's unlearnt behavioural bias is then sufficient to give a second system the input it needs to learn to reidentify individual faces. Through being given the right kind of input, this learning system has the chance to extract the statistical properties that distinguish one face from another and the statistical invariants that signify the same face again. Once trained up, the second system also implicitly encodes information: a rich store of information about which features indicate the same face (John, say). Unlike the information in the initial visual tracking tendency, this latter match between system and 13 Carey also observes that the child makes a 'leap' when drawing a parallel between the operation of adding one object in the object file system and the process of counting on to the next item in the (initially uninterpreted) sequence of counting words. Shea (2011) argued that this is the step at which Fodor's argument is circumvented, and that this step is not explicable as a rational transition from the content of pre-existing representational resources.
environment is not due to evolution, but to individual learning (from the experience of seeing John).
What contents are represented at these two stages of development? The answer depends upon the correct theory of content, about which there is no consensus, so I will again deploy asymmetric dependence theory and infotel semantics. At birth infants have the capacity to detect moving blobs and certain configurations of blobs. Some internal state driving their looking behaviour covaries roughly with the presence of faces, but there do not seem to be asymmetric dependencies between the various kinds of information carried or, if there are, it is the capacity to detect faces that looks to be asymmetrically dependent on the capacity to detect configurations of blobs, rather than the other way round. So, according to Fodor's theory of content, infants do not represent faces at the outset.
14 As a result of learning, the infant comes to be able to reidentify a particular In the last section we saw that PDP modelling of representational development opens up a new portion of logical space for cognitive science to explore: that representations are distributed over the resources that account for their development, breaking the link 15 Fodor says that interaction with doorknobs is needed to trigger the DOORKNOB concept because being a doorknob is a response-dependent property Fodor (1998) . Whether or not that response works for DOORKNOB, it is implausible that being John (a particular person) is a response-dependent property.
between psychological explanation and explanation-by-content. In this section we saw that the same tactic gives us a more general answer to Fodor's puzzle about representational innateness. This paper has shown that to be more than just a theoretical possibility.
Connectionist models offer concrete examples of that process. In order to see connectionist models as accounting for the development of new representations we have to reject the assumption that development of new representations can be explained-bycontent, an assumption that lies at the heart of Fodor's critique of connectionism, and of his radical concept nativism. This paper argues that we should reject that assumption and Connectionist representations can be distributed over the objects that figure in an account of their development. In that way, connectionist modelling has provided a deep philosophical insight and an important contribution to theoretical progress in cognitive science: new, non-innate representations can develop in ways that are not explicable-bycontent.
